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In the stable marriage problem N men and N women have
to be matched by pairs under the constraint that the result-
ing matching is stable. We study the statistical properties of
stable matchings in the large N limit using both numerical
and analytical methods. Generalizations of the model includ-
ing singles and unequal numbers of men and women are also
investigated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The study of complex systems that are built up of
many individuals interacting according to relatively sim-
ple laws has recently attracted a lot of interest among
physicists. Concepts and methods developed in statisti-
cal physics have successfully been applied to describe col-
lective and nonlinear phenomena arising in such systems.
Studies on traffic flow, stock markets, voting, flocking
birds, evolution etc. are only a few examples to mention
here.
In the stable marriage problem the elements of two sets
have to be matched by pairs. As possible applications one
could think of job seekers and employers, lodgers and
landlords, or simply men and women who want to get
married. For the sake of clearness and simplicity we will
exclusively refer to the paradigm of marriage in this pa-
per. The purpose of most studies of the stable marriage
problem has so far been to unravel the underlying math-
ematical structure and to develop new or improve exist-
ing algorithms for finding stable marriages [1,2]. Only
recently it has been recognized that the stable marriage
problem has many features in common with classical dis-
ordered systems in statistical physics like spin glasses, in
particular the element of frustration and the existence
of many competing states [3]. Applying methods devel-
oped in statistical mechanics, Nieuwenhuizen [4] solved
several variants of the stable marriage problem, including
bachelors and polygamy. In his approach, Nieuwenhuizen
focussed on the properties of globally optimal matchings
which are advantageous for the society as a whole, but
not necessarily for all individuals. Here we consider the
opposite limit where all individuals pursue only their own
egoistic objectives regardless of the consequences for oth-
ers. Under these conditions, only matchings that are
stable with respect to the actions of all individuals are
relevant. In the framework of game theory this kind of
stability is termed Nash equilibrium.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
introduce the stable marriage model and set up the no-
tation. The Gale-Shapley algorithm and the properties
of the stable matchings obtained with it are presented in
Section 3. In Section 4 we analyze the set of all stable
matchings. Generalizations of the model, introducing an
acceptance threshold and unequal number of men and
women are discussed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively.
Finally, we summarize our results in Section 7.
II. THE STABLE MARRIAGE MODEL
We consider a society consisting of N men and N
women who have to be matched by pairs. The cost for
man i to be married with woman j is x(i, j) and the
cost for woman j to be married with man i is y(j, i).
In order to investigate statistical properties of the model
we assume that all cost functions are independent ran-
dom variables uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 1.
Since all individuals simultaneously attempt to optimize
their own benefit by being married with a partner of low-
est possible cost, conflicting wishes arise, and in general
it is impossible to find a matching where everybody is
perfectly satisfied. Let us assume that a matching is
formed where man i is married with woman j. We define
xi ≡ x(i, j) and yj ≡ y(j, i), i.e. xi is the cost for man i
in this particular matching and yj the corresponding cost
for woman j. Instead of cost we will frequently use the
expression energy in order to emphasize the analogy with
physical systems where the energy is the quantity to be
minimized in the groundstate. For later convenience, we
introduce the total energies of men and women by
X =
N∑
i=1
xi Y =
N∑
j=1
yj (1)
In search of the rules according to which marriages can
be formed or broken, essentially two points of view have
1In Ref. [4] a different probability distribution has been con-
sidered, namely ρ(x) ∝ xr exp(−x). The case r = 0 corre-
sponds essentially to our choice.
emerged: In the first one, the goal is to find the glob-
ally best matching, i.e. the one where the total energy
U = X + Y is minimal. This problem has recently been
studied by Nieuwenhuizen [4] using techniques borrowed
from statistical physics of disordered systems, such as
the replica trick. The second point of view, that we will
adopt, emphasizes the role of individuals as decision-
makers. As long as there is no supervising body like
church or government that dictates who has to be mar-
ried with whom no individual is obliged to stay in an
unsatisfactory relationship if he or she can find a better
one. This leads us to the notion of stability. A matching
is called stable if there is no man and no woman who pre-
fer each other to their actual partners. In other words, a
matching is unstable, if there exists a man i and a woman
j, who are not married with each other, such that
xi > x(i, j) and yj > y(j, i) (2)
The particular significance of stable matchings lies in the
fact that they cannot be broken, neither by the action of
a single pair nor by any coalition of men and women. In
contrast to the globally best matching which can only be
found with the help of computers for very small numbers
of men and women, there exist powerful algorithms to
search for stable matchings, even for systems of several
thousands of individuals. The simplest of these algo-
rithms, introduced by Gale and Shapley some time ago
[5], will be presented in the next section.
III. THE GALE-SHAPLEY ALGORITHM
In the man-oriented Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm only
men make proposals while women accept or reject. In the
beginning every man makes up a list where he places the
women according to his preferences. The smaller the cost
x(i, j) the higher the position of woman j on the list of
man i. Then a series of proposals starts. Whenever a
man is not married he makes a proposal to the woman
with the highest rank among those to whom he has not
yet proposed. If the woman is not engaged she accepts
the proposal and they get married. If the woman is al-
ready married, she accepts if she prefers the suitor to her
husband. In this case she divorces and gets married with
the proposer. The algorithm stops when the last woman
has received an offer and gets married. The number of
proposals r that a man has to make on the average during
the execution of the GS algorithm has been calculated in
[3]. The result is
r ≃ logN +C (3)
where C = 0.5772... is Euler’s constant and corrections
are negative and of order (logN)2/N . Amazingly, the
knowledge of r is already sufficient to calculate the total
energy of men (X) and women (Y ) in the GS matching.
With every proposal the energy of one man increases by
≃ 1/N since he has to move forward one step on his
preference list. Consequently, the total energy of men is
on the average the same as the number of proposals that
every man makes, i.e. X = r.
Each woman also receives on the average r propos-
als. Keeping only the best offer i.e. the smallest out of
r random numbers between 0 and 1 yields a best value
of y = 1/(r + 1). Taking into account that the num-
ber of proposals that a woman receives is not fixed, but
distributed according to a binomial distribution yields
y = (1− exp(−r))/r ≈ 1/r (see Appendix B). Using Eq.
(3) we obtain the following estimates for the energies of
men and women in the man-oriented GS matching
X ≃ logN +C Y ≃ N
logN +C
(4)
which implies the relation X Y = N .
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FIG. 1. Average energy of men and women in the
man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm as a function of N .
Fig. 1 shows the average energies X and Y of men and
women obtained with the man-oriented GS algorithm as
function of N . Each data point represents an average
over several thousand realizations. A logarithmic scale is
used for the energy axis in order to highlight the good
agreement with the analytical result of Eq.(4) even for
small values of N .
Of course, everything that has been said about the
man-oriented GS algorithm is also valid in the woman-
oriented version where the roles of men and women are
interchanged, i.e. women propose and men judge. It has
been shown [2] that the stable matching obtained from
the man–oriented execution of the GS algorithm is man–
optimal in the sense that no man can have lower energy
in any other stable matching. Similarly, it is the worst
possible stable matching for women. Therefore the ener-
gies obtained by performing the GS algorithm provide an
upper and a lower bound for the possible energy range
of all stable matchings. Furthermore, if the man and
the woman–optimal matching happen to be identical we
know for sure that in this case there exists only one single
stable matching.
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IV. THE SET OF ALL STABLE MATCHINGS
If N is large, there are generally many other sta-
ble matchings besides the man and the woman-optimal
matchings that can be obtained with the GS algorithm.
Although the maximum number of stable matchings in a
system of size N is not known, there exist lower bounds
[2]; e.g. for N = 32 the maximum number of stable
matchings is larger than 1011 (!).
In order to calculate the average number of stable
matchings we consider an arbitrary matching of N men
and N women. This matching is unstable, if there exists
a man i and a woman j who are not married with each
other, and whose mutual costs x(i, j) and y(j, i) are both
lower than the ones in the existing matching, xi and yj,
respectively. The probability that man i and woman j
prefer to stay with their respective partners is therefore
pij = 1 − xi yj and the whole matching is stable with
probability
P =
∫ 1
0
dNx
∫ 1
0
dNy
∏
i6=j
(1 − xi yj) (5)
Although this 2N -fold integral, originally derived by
Knuth [1], looks quite simple, it cannot be done exactly
unless N is very small. Using rather involved proba-
bilistic arguments, Pittel [6] has derived an asymptotic
formula,
P ≃ logN
eΓ(N)
(6)
valid in the limit N → ∞. However, comparing Eq.
(6) with numerical simulations we found rather serious
discrepancies (see Fig. 2). In order to remove these dis-
crepancies and to provide a more transparent approach
we replace the factors 1−xi yj in Eq. (5) by exp(−xi yj),
which is justified since the dominant contribution to the
integral comes from the region where the products xiyj
are small. Dropping the constraint i 6= j we arrive at the
approximation
P˜ =
∫ 1
0
dNx
∫ 1
0
dNy exp(−X Y ) (7)
where the variables X =
∑N
i=1 xi and Y =
∑N
j=1 yj are
the energies of men and women, respectively. Eq. (7)
can also be viewed as the partition sum of two species of
particles confined to the interval [0, 1] whose interaction
is the product of their center of mass coordinates. It is
convenient to replace the integral over the variables xi
and yj by an integral over X and Y
P˜ =
∫ N
0
dX
∫ N
0
dY ρ(X)ρ(Y ) exp(−XY ) (8)
where the probability distribution of X is asymptotic to
ρ(X) ≃ X
N−1
Γ(N)
(
1− exp(−N
X
)
)N
(9)
for small X (see Appendix A). Inserting Eq. (9) in Eq.
(8) and introducing t = XY as new integration variable
we obtain
P˜ = Γ(N)−2
∫ N
log N
0
dXX−1
∫ N X
log N
0
dt tN−1 exp(−t)
≃ Γ(N)−1
∫ N
log N
log N
dXX−1
= Γ(N)−1 (logN − 2 log(logN)) (10)
where we have assumed that the factor
(
1− exp(−N
X
)
)N
imposes a cut-off ≃ N/ logN on the X-integration and
the same holds for Y . The integral over t yields Γ(N),
provided that X > logN . Comparison with Eq. (6)
shows that the ratio P˜ /P approaches e = exp(1) in the
limit N → ∞ which we also checked numerically. Since
there are in total N ! = Γ(N + 1) matchings the average
number of stable matchings is given by
S ≃ N
e
(logN − 2 log(logN)) (11)
N
S
40035030025020015010050
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
FIG. 2. Average number of stable matchings S as function
of N . Numerical simulations (circles) in comparison with the
analytic expression of ref. [6] (solid curve) and our result of
Eq.(11) (dashed curve).
S is plotted as function of N in Fig. 2. The circles
are data obtained from numerical simulations using the
algorithm of Gusfield and Irving [2] that allows the deter-
mination of all stable matchings. Each data point repre-
sents an average over 200 random realizations of the pref-
erence lists. The dashed curve is the result of Eq. (11)
and the solid curve is the asymptotic formula derived by
Pittel [6]. Note the large error made by neglecting the
log(logN) term.
In the following we investigate how the energies of men
and women are correlated in stable matchings. From Eq.
3
(8) we see that ρ(X,Y ) = ρ(X)ρ(Y ) exp(−XY ) can be
considered as the probability density of finding a sta-
ble matching with energies X and Y . Due to the factor(
1− exp(−N
X
)
)N
that appears in ρ(X) the occurrence
of stable matchings with X > N/ logN is very unlikely,
and by symmetry, the same cutoff exists for Y . This ob-
servation is in accordance with our analysis of the GS
algorithm, where we found that the energy of women in
the man-optimal stable matching (i.e. the worst possi-
ble for women) is ≃ N/ logN , and vice versa. In the
region logN < X,Y < N/ logN the probability distri-
bution simplifies to ρ(X,Y ) ∝ (XY )N−1 exp(−XY ). It
depends only on the product of men’s and women’s ener-
gies and is sharply peaked around the curve XY = N for
large values of N . Mean-value and standard deviation of
the product XY are given by
〈XY 〉 = N, σ(XY ) =
√
N (12)
where 〈. . .〉 denotes the average calculated with ρ(X,Y ).
At the symmetric point X = Y =
√
N the width of the
distribution is O(1) which means that relative fluctua-
tions go to zero for N →∞.
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FIG. 3. Probability distribution of log S for N = 50. Nu-
merical simulations (circles) fitted by a Gaussian.
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FIG. 4. Standard deviation σ of log S as function of N .
The numerical results (circles) seem to converge to the solid
line σ∞ ≈ 0.48 for N →∞.
Finally, we investigate the probability distribution of
the number of stable matchings using numerical simula-
tions. While S has a very asymmetric distribution which
decays quite slowly for large values of S, the distribution
of log S can be nicely fitted with a Gaussian, as shown in
Fig. 3 for N = 50. Remarkably, the width of the distri-
bution, i.e. the standard deviation σ(logS) approaches a
constant value σ∞ ≈ 0.48 for large N as shown in Fig. 4.
We have no argument to explain this universal behavior.
V. ACCEPTANCE THRESHOLD
Up to now we have assumed that every person has to
get married. In the following we soften this condition by
introducing an acceptance threshold ∆ < 1 which is the
energy of individuals who remain single. In principle,
∆ could be chosen at random for all individuals, or at
least be different for men and women, but for the sake of
simplicity we consider only the case where ∆ is the same
for all men and all women.
Let us consider a situation where ∆ is sufficiently large
that singles do not occur. The GS algorithm is readily
generalized to the case with acceptance threshold. In
the man-oriented version the only difference is that now
women – even when unmarried – refuse proposals from
men whose energy is higher than ∆. This increases the
average number of proposals that are necessary to arrive
at a stable matching by a factor of 1/∆. The generaliza-
tion of Eq. (4) to the case ∆ 6= 1 reads
X(∆) ≃ logN + C
∆
Y (∆) ≃ ∆ N
logN +C
(13)
Both energies coincide for
∆c =
logN + C√
N
(14)
and we conclude that for ∆ < ∆c there exist only few
or one single stable matching. This fact can be used to
generate approximately sex-fair stable matchings – which
is difficult to achieve by other means – using the GS
algorithm and setting ∆ = ∆c.
In the limit when ∆ is sufficiently small it becomes
favorable for a certain fraction of men and women to re-
main single. In this case it is hard to calculate the average
number of proposals r explicitly since the series of pro-
posals is not only terminated when all men are married
but also if no acceptable women are available. On the
other hand the energies of men and women coincide in
this regime since there exists only one stable matching.
Let us assume that a woman has received r proposals
out of which she keeps only the best one. If none of the
proposals are better than the threshold ∆ she remains
4
single at the cost of ∆. Analyzing the probability dis-
tribution of the best offer (see Appendix B) yields the
average energy of women
Y =
N
X
(1− exp(−X∆)) (15)
From the condition X = Y we obtain
X2 = N (1− exp(−X∆)) (16)
In general this equation can only be solved numerically.
The limiting cases are
X(∆) ≃
{
N∆ for ∆≪ 1√
N√
N for ∆≫ 1√
N
(17)
which means that for sufficiently small ∆ it is advan-
tageous for almost everybody to remain single (at the
energy ∆) while for ∆ >∼ 1/
√
N the energies in sex-fair
matchings are X = Y =
√
N , in agreement with our
previous considerations.
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FIG. 5. Energy of men as function of ∆. Open circles:
solution of lowest energy (man-optimal GS), filled circles: so-
lution of highest energy (woman-optimal GS). The solid and
the dashed curves are the analytical results of Eq. (13) and
Eq. (16), valid for ∆ > ∆c and ∆ < ∆c, respectively.
In Fig. 5 we show the energy of men and women in
the man-optimal stable matching as function of ∆ for
N = 200. Each data point represents the average over
1000 executions of the GS algorithm. The agreement be-
tween numerical and analytical results is very good with
the exception of the cross-over region around ∆c where
neither of the conditions that were made to treat the
problem (absence of singles in the case ∆ > ∆c, exis-
tence of only one stable matching in the case ∆ < ∆c) is
strictly fulfilled.
In the following we investigate how the number of sin-
gles depends on the acceptance threshold ∆. The prob-
ability that a woman who receives r proposals rejects all
of them and remains single is ps = (1 − ∆)r . Taking
into account that the number of proposals addressed to
a particular woman is distributed according to a binomial
distribution the average number of singles Ns is related
to the energy X via
Ns(∆) = N exp(−X∆) (18)
(see Appendix C) and can be calculated explicitly from
the solution of Eq.(16). The limiting cases are
Ns(∆) ≃
{
N exp(−∆2N) for ∆≪ 1√
N
N exp(−∆
√
N) for ∆≫ 1√
N
(19)
When ∆ is decreased, the first single appears when
Ns(∆) = 1. This is the case for ∆ = logN/
√
N ≃ ∆c in
accordance with our assumption that there are no singles
for ∆ > ∆c.
Finally, we generalize our results concerning the aver-
age number of stable matchings to the case with thresh-
old ∆ < 1. The only difference compared to the calcula-
tion for ∆ = 1 is that the probability distribution of X
(see Appendix A) has to be replaced by
ρ(X) ≃ X
N−1
Γ(N)
(
1− exp(−N∆
X
)
)N
(20)
which takes into account that all energies xi have to be
smaller than ∆. Making the same approximations as be-
fore we obtain for the average number of stable matchings
S(∆) ≃ N
e
(logN − 2 log(logN) + 2 log∆) (21)
S(∆) goes to zero at ∆ = logN/
√
N ≃ ∆c in agree-
ment with the fact that man and woman-optimal stable
matchings coincide for ∆ < ∆c.
VI. UNEQUAL NUMBER OF MEN AND WOMEN
Let us now consider the more general case where the
number of men and women is not the same. To be spe-
cific, we assume that there are N+1 men and N women.
It is obvious that in this case at least one man has to
remain single. As before, the GS algorithm can be used
to find the man-optimal and the woman-optimal stable
matching, respectively, depending on who proposes and
who judges. There is now a fundamental asymmetry be-
tween the man and the woman-oriented version: when
women propose the algorithm stops as usual when the
last woman has found a husband; in the man-oriented
version, however, the series of proposals stops only when
the first man has reached the bottom of his list, i.e. when
he has been rejected by all women and must stay sin-
gle. Therefore, the members of the minority group (the
women in our case) are substantially favored.
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FIG. 6. Energy of men (circles) and women (triangles) as
function of ∆ for 200 women and 201 men. Full and open
symbols denote the best and the worst possible solution, re-
spectively. The solid and the dashed curves are the analytical
results discussed in the text.
This is illustrated in Fig. 6 where the energy of men
(circles) and women (triangles) is plotted versus the ac-
ceptance threshold ∆. The data points represent aver-
ages of 1000 samples using the GS algorithm for 201 men
and 200 women. Best (open symbols) and worst solu-
tions (filled symbols) are much closer in energy now than
in the symmetric case with equal number of men and
women (see Fig. 5 for comparison) indicating that the to-
tal number of stable matchings is reduced. The energies
in all other stable matchings lie in the two narrow corri-
dors between the best and the worst solution. The dashed
curves areX(∆) = X(1)∆ and Y (∆) = Y (1)/∆ obtained
from the generalization of Eq. (13) to the present case
while the solid curve is the solution of Eq. (16) valid for
∆ < ∆c.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the statistical properties of sta-
ble marriages using both numerical and analytical tools.
A detailed analysis of the GS algorithm is provided. This
algorithm yields two extreme stable matchings and is
thus particularly useful to characterize the whole set of
stable matchings. The average number of stable match-
ings is calculated from an integral representation that can
be viewed as the partition sum of two species of particles
living on the unit interval, with multiplicative interaction
of their center of mass coordinates. Our analytical result
agrees very well with numerical simulations, in contrast
to a previously obtained, less accurate formula. In addi-
tion, the fundamental relation XY = N between the en-
ergy of men and women in stable matchings follows quite
naturally from our approach. Numerical simulations in-
dicate that the probability distribution of the logarithm
of the number of stable matchings is Gaussian with a
universal width σ∞ ≈ 0.48 for N →∞.
When an acceptance threshold ∆ is introduced, the
number of stable matchings shrinks and singles occur.
Three different regimes can be identified: For ∆ > ∆c ≃
logN/
√
N there are many stable matchings whose en-
ergies extend over a wide range and no singles occur.
For 1/
√
N < ∆ < ∆c there are very few or only one
stable matching. In this regime the energy of men and
women is nearly independent of ∆ although the num-
ber of singles increases exponentially with decreasing ∆.
For ∆ < 1/
√
N there are many singles and only a small
fraction of married individuals. When the number of
men and women is not the same, the number of stable
matchings is also substantially reduced. Furthermore,
the members of the minority group are strongly favored
compared to the majority group, even if there is only one
additional member.
The general ideas discussed in this paper could become
important for investigations on the labour market since
nowadays information about forthcoming job opportuni-
ties, on the one hand, and qualifications of applicants,
on the other hand, can be made available to everybody
via the internet. Preliminary results on applications of
the stable marriage problem in the context of the labour
market can be found in [7]. Further work on this subject
is in progress.
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APPENDIX A: CALCULATION OF ρ(X)
In this appendix we calculate the distribution function
ρ(X) of the variable X =
∑
i xi which is formally given
by
ρ(X) =
∫ 1
0
dNx δ(X −
∑
i
xi) (A1)
According to the central limit theorem ρ(X) converges
to a normal distribution
ρ(X) =
1√
2piσ2
exp(− (X − X¯)
2
2σ2
) (A2)
with X¯ = N/2 and σ2 = N/12 for large N . This is
however only true for the central part of the distribution
whereas the tails of ρ(X) look very different. Let us
introduce new variables qi such that xi = qi−qi−1 for i =
1, N and q0 = 0, qN = X . Disregarding the constraint
xi < 1 for the moment we obtain
ρ(X) =
1
Γ(N)
∫ X
0
dq1 . . .
∫ X
0
dqN−1 =
XN−1
Γ(N)
(A3)
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where the factor Γ(N) occurs due to the fact that the
qi have to be arranged in ascending order to satisfy
the condition xi ≥ 0. The condition xi < 1 can
now be to implemented as follows: Considering the qi
as independent random variables uniformly distributed
in the interval [0, X ] we obtain a Poisson distribution
p(x) = λ exp (−λx) for the distance x between two con-
secutive numbers, where λ = N/X . The probability that
all xi < 1 is therefore given by
P (all xi < 1) =
(∫ 1
0
dx p(x)
)N
=
(
1− exp (−N
X
)
)N
(A4)
neglecting the weak correlations among the xi due to the
fact that their sum is fixed. Combining Eqs. (A3) and
(A4) we obtain the final result
ρ(X) =
XN−1
Γ(N)
(
1− exp (−N
X
)
)N
(A5)
valid for X < N/ logN .
APPENDIX B: AVERAGE ENERGY OF WOMEN
Let us assume that men propose in the GS algorithm
and that a woman receives r proposals out of which she
keeps only the best one. If none of the offers is better
than ∆ she remains single at the energy ∆. The average
energy thus obtained is
y =
1
r + 1
(
1− (1−∆)r+1) (B1)
We have to take into account that the number r of pro-
posals that a woman receives is not fixed but distributed
according to the binomial distribution
b(r) =
(
R
r
)
pr(1− p)R−r (B2)
where R is the total number of proposals that men make
during the execution of the GS algorithm and p = 1/N is
the probability that such an offer is addressed to a given
woman. Averaging Eq. (B1) with respect to b(r) yields
〈
1
r + 1
〉
=
R∑
r=0
(
R
r
)
pr(1− p)R−r 1
r + 1
=
N
R+ 1
(
1− (1− 1
N
)R+1
)
(B3)
and similarly〈
(1−∆)r+1
r + 1
〉
=
N
R+ 1
(
(1− ∆
N
)R+1 − (1 − 1
N
)R+1
)
(B4)
Combining Eqs. (B1), (B3) and (B4) we obtain
〈y〉 = N
R+ 1
(
1− (1− ∆
N
)R+1
)
≈ N
R
(
1− exp (−R
N
∆)
)
(B5)
The average energy of women Y = N〈y〉 is therefore
related to the energy of men X = R/N via
Y =
N
X
(1− exp (−X∆)) (B6)
APPENDIX C: NUMBER OF SINGLES
The probability for a woman to remain single after
receiving r proposals is ps = (1 − ∆)r. Averaging with
respect to the binomial distribution (B2) yields
〈ps〉 =
R∑
r=0
(
R
r
)
pr(1 − p)R−r(1−∆)r =
(
1− ∆
N
)R
(C1)
where p = 1/N and R is the total number of proposals
made. Using X = R/N we obtain
〈ps〉 = exp(−X∆) (C2)
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